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[23 C.2d 
rendered 'the notice: inefIectiveno. real object would be served· 
by striking· jt from, the, fUes. Furthermore, the Jact that the 
notice .might beine~.ectivefor one purpose w:ould not neces-
sarily mean that his' ineffective for other purposes. . . . 
In relying upon the cases of Waddingham v. Tubbs, 95 Cal. 
249 [30P; 527], and Santa Ana etc. Co. v. Ern~st .Ruru~ I?s-
tate, 23Cal..App.2d M5 [73 P.2d 908], the m~Jor~ty Opll~10n 
#i.lB' fo recognjZet,he rule' that a stronger ~howlllg IS r.eqUlred 
t{i ~.uBtify il:tterference·with a~ order grantlllg a ne~trlal than 
.:wfili one whi~h has Qeen demed. (See Abercromb'l-e v. Thom~ 
rstn;59'::<JatA.pp:~d'?31, 337' [138 P.~d. 701}:) ,Thus Wad~ 
,di~g"kam,:v .. Tubbs; supra, is clearly dlstlllgUlsh.able from~he 
present action, f9rthere the court not only denIed the ~otlon 
fora new trial but also held that there was no error m the 
fac~'sta:t~din ;the notice of entry of judgmen.,.t. And in Santa 
Ana etc. Co. v.·· Ernest. Ru1'up Estate,supra, another case 
where the Illotion for new· trial was denied, the notice of entry 
of Judgment was . in the customary form and correctly con· 
tained all of the necessary data. 
For these reasons, I beHeve, as no appeal was taken from 
the order granting a new trial, the judgment was vacated 
and the appeal should be dismissed. 
Shenk, J., and Curtis, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 18341. In Bank. Oct. 6, 1943.] 
FRED J. KAHN et al., Petitioners, v. B. J. SMITH, as 
County Clerk, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Mandamus-To Court Oflicers.-Mandamus is an appropriate 
remedy to compel the county clerk to issue a writ of execution 
where an order granting a new trial is invalid and execution 
has been, denied, despite the availability of an appeal from 
that order. 
[2] , Id.~Conditions Affecting. Issuance-Existence of Other Rem-
edy-Appeal as Inadequate.-While mandamus does not lie 
[1] See 16 CaI.Jur. 837;35 Am.Jur. 22. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] MaIldamus, § 66; [2]. Mandamus, 
§ 15(5); [3] Time, § 9; New Trial, §216(2); [4] Process, § 86; 
[5] Costs, § 32. 
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if there is ~nother adequate remedy, the writ is available as 
an alternative remedy where an appeal would be inadequate, 
in which case a failure to. appeal cannot render the trial 
court's determination res judicata. 
[8] Time-Fractions of a Day:-New Trial-Procedure-Statu-
tory Period for Determination""':'When Period Commences.-
Fractions of a day are not considered in the computation of 
time if they do not affect the substantial rights of a party. 
They will be disregarded in ascertaining whether notice of 
entry of judgment was made within the time prescribed by 
Code Civ. Proc., § 660, as the time limit for making a motion 
for new trial and the time limit for the court to pass on such 
motion starts from the day and not from the hour of service. 
[4] Process-Notices and Papers-Gi~ing Notice~By Mall.-Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1013, allowing an additional day after service by 
mail if, within a given number of days after such service, an 
act is to be done by the adverse party, is not applicable in a 
mandamus proceeding to compel the county clerk to issue a 
writ of execution after the court erroneously granted a new 
trial on thesixty-flrst day after notice of entry of judgment 
was served, for the court is not an adverse party to such pro-
ceeding. 
[5] Costs-Items Allowable-Attorney's Fees.-Attorney's fees are 
not ordinarily awarded to the successful party without express 
statutory authorization. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel County Clerk of 
Orange County to issue a writ of execution. Writ of mandamus 
granted. 
Laurence B. Martin for Petitioners. 
Joel E. Ogle, County Counsel, and Forgy, Reinhaus & Forgy 
for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On August 25, 1939, Fred J. Kahn and 
his wife, Alice J. Kahn, brought suit against the San Diego 
Orange Growers and Mr. Glann Feldner. On August 22, 1940, 
Mr. and Mrs. Kahn served notice on the defendants in that 
action that the judgment in their favor had been entered on 
the preceding day. They were in error, the judgment actu-
ally having been entered on the 22nd. Their error was the 
result of misinformation ina letter to them from the county 
[5] See 7 Cal.Jur. 286; 14 Am.Jur. 38. 
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clerk. On August 30th, the defendants served and filed a r 
notice of intention to move for a new trial. The motion was 
granted on October 22nd, more than sixty days from the date 
on which the notice of entry of judgment was served. Mr. 
and Mrs. Kahn filed a notice ofap peal from the order grant-
ing the new trial, but immedIately thereafter filed a with-
drawal of appeal. Subsequently they sought Ii writ of execu-
tion from the county clerk, which was refused. Theynow 
petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk. to issue 
a writ of execution. 
[1] If the order granting a new trial was not valid, the 
clerk should have issued the writ of execution, and mandamus 
is the appropriate remedy to enforce the performance of that 
duty despite the availability of an appeal. (Payne v. Hunt, 
214 Cal. 605 [7 P.2d 302] j Kraft v. Lampton, 13 Cal.App.2d 
596 [57 P.2d 171] j Holquin v. Allison, 97 Cal.App. 126 [274 
P. 1037] j see 16 Cal.Jur. 837.) 
[2] While mandamUs does not lie if there is another ade-
quate remedy, an appeal is not regarded as adequate in this 
type of case. (Payne v.Hunt, supra; Kraft v. Lampton, supraj 
Holquin v. Allison, supra; Christ v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. 
593 [296 P. 612] j Middlecoff v .. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 410 
[31 P.2d 200] j Evans v.,Superior Court, 14 Ca1.2d 563 [96 
P.2d 107J j Harrison v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.App.2d 469 [39 
P.2d 825].) Mandamus is available as an alternative remedy in 
cases where an appeal would be inadequate, and the failure to 
appeal cannot therefore render the trial court's determination 
res judicata. (Payne v. Hunt, supra; Middlecoff v. Superior 
Court, supra; Conklin v. Superior Court, 1 Ca1.2d 601 [36 P.2d 
386] j Kraft v. Lampton, supra; Holquin v. Allison, supra; 
Moch v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.App. 471 [179 P. 440] jHar-
rison v. Superior Court, supra.) The contention that the serv-
ice of the notice did not start the sixty-day period running 
because the notice of entry of judgment misstated the date 
on which judgment was entered must be rejected for the rea-
sons given in McCordic v. Crawford, ante, p. 1 [142 P.2d 7]. 
[3] Respondent contends that there has been no showing 
that the notice of entry of judgment was not served prema-
turely. The record shows only that service took place on the 
day on which judgment was entered and does not disclose 
the hour at which either event took place. It is ordinarily 
impossible, however, to prove the hour at which an act such 
as entry of judgment occurred, for records are not kept in 
Oct. 1943J KAHN' V. ~MTTH 
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~uch minute detail. (Cosgriff v. Election O(nntnis~imier~. 
151 Cal. 407, 409 [91P. 98].) Fractions :ofpaYSJ~rediS1.. 
regarded jf they do not affect' tb.esubstantiai"i-ights ,'ofrE!· 
party. (C osgriff v. Election Coritm~ssion'er8,sup~(i'.:lMlm~~. 
v. Blessington, 136 Cal. 3 [68 P; jllji8cov~"lley;;;J~dt~scm~; 
13] Cal. 590 [63 P. 1013J ;' Gray v .. Mater&; Zobf6lei'ln:iJre:uf-;' 
ery, 2 Cal.App. 653, 658 [84 P. 2S0j.)In this .c:ias~,th~Y 
do not, for the time limit for maki'ng 8. motion for":bew. tii81, 
and the ~ime limit for the court to pass -on sUchm:01:ron s~~.', 
from the day and not the hour of service. ' . ,'.;. . ..•. -: 
[4]. -Respondent ihvok~s section 1013 of the Code. of CiVU:, , 
Procedure allowing an additional day ~fte~- $~rViceibYin8i( 
".:. if, within a given number of days aftersnchservice, 
a right may be exercised, or an act is to be done by the ad. 
verse party~ ... " This section is inapplicable here, for the" 
court is not an adverse party. . 
[5] Petitioner;s request for attorney's' fees in this action 
must be denied, under the rule that attorney's fees are not 
ord!narily awarded to' the successful .. party _withotit expr'ess 
statutory authorization. (Los Angeles Trust ~'. Savings 
Bank v~ Ward, 197 Cal. 103 [239 P 847]; see Code Civ. Proc., 
sec. 1021 ; 7 Cal.J ur. 286.) 
Let the peremptory writ of manda~u~ issue as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Peters, J. pro tem., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J., Dissenting.-To me. the conclusion reached 
by my associates is directly contra.ry to the fundamental rule 
that where the trial court has affirmatively acted upon a mo-
tion for a new trial, the limitations upon the exercise of such 
jurisdiction will be construed, whereve:rposSible,so as to sus-
tain the action as a proper exercise of itS jurIsdiction. (Spier 
v. Lang, 4 CaL2d 711, 714, 715 [53 P.2d 138] j'PappadaJos 
v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. 334 [287 P .. 342];' iIOlldlndv. 
Superior Court, 121 Cal.App. 523,531 [9 P.2d531j.) Cer-
tainly the settlement of disputed issues in the trial court 
is to be favored, and an orderdetermiriing that justicere-
quires another hearing of ~hem should not be set asid,e unless 
it may be said that there has been an abuse of discretion or 
the· successful litigant, by a strict compliance with the stat-
ute, has limited the authority to act. 
The sixty-day jurisdictiona.l period provided by section 660 
! " 
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of the Code of Civil Procedul"e, within which the trial court 
has the power to pass upon a motion for new trial, is set in 
operation either by the service of written notice of the entry 
of judgment, or, if such notice has not theretofore been served, 
by the filing of the notice of intention to move for a new trial. 
In my opinion, for the reasons stated by me in McCordic v. 
Crawford, ante, p. 1 [142 P.2d 7], when the trial court 
has g-ranted a motion for a new trial within sixty days 
from the filing of the notice of intention so to do, the review-
ing court should require that a notice of entry of judgment, 
effective to start the earlier running of the jurisdictional 
period, be completely accurate on its face. 
In addition, the conclusion reached in the majority opinion 
is contrary to accepted principles governing collateral at-
tack upon appealable orders. . Implicit in the order granting 
the new trial is the trial court's determination that the notice 
of entry of judgment was ineffective to limit its jurisdiction 
to pass upon the motion. Even though, under the views of 
the majority of this court, that decision was erroneous, it 
became final when the petitioner failed to appeal from it and 
is now res judicata. (See Gore v. Bingaman, 20 Cal.2d 118, 
121 [124 P.2d 17] ; Clary v. Hoagland, 6 Cal. 685, 688.) The 
determination, although erroneous, is not subject to collateral 
attack. 
But, in any event, the petitioners are not entitled to the 
remedy they now seek to invoke. As a general rule, the 
writ of mandate issues only "where there is not a plain, 
speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law." 
(Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1086; Irvine v. Gibson, 19 Cal.2d 14 
[118 P.2d 812]; Dobyns v. Cheshire. 9 Cal.App.2d 77[48 
P.2d 743] ; Hitch v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.App.2d 406 [38 
P.2d 190].) The existence of a remedy by appeal.generally 
precludes resort to mandamus. (Andrews v. Police CO'Urt, 
21 Ca1.2d 479 [133 P.2d398] ; Petaluma etc. Dist. v. Superior 
Court, 194 Cal. 183 [228 P. 24] ; Hanlon v. Superior Court, 
124 Cal.App. 485 [12 P.2d 963].) Moreover, ordinarily the 
writ of mandamus is not the proper remedy to invoke against, 
an order made in excess of jurisdiction. (Nider v. City 
Commission, 36 Cal.App.2d 14, 25 [97 P.2d 293]; Levy v. 
Superior Court, 66 Cal. "292 [5 P. 353]; Elliott v. Paterson, 
65 Cal. 109 [3 P. 493]; Robbins v. Mulcrevy, 101 Cal.App. 
300 [281 P. 668].) 
Oct. 1943] KAHN V. SMITH" 
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- Even though a judgment be void on its face for want of 
jurisdiction, mandamus will not lie to compel its vacation 
where the petitioner could have appealed from the order 
denying his motion to vacate the. judgment. (Andrews v.: 
Police Court, supra.) And,said the court, the loss ?y neg· 
lect of a legal remedy equally convenient, benefiCIal and' 
effective does not require the granting of a writ of mandate 
in the absence of a sufficient showing of excuse for the failure' 
to pursue it. An annotation in -145 A.L.R. 1042, 1044-1059 
to this most recent pronouncement of the court states: "It is 
one of the fundamental principles underlying the entire law 
of mandamus that the existence of another specific, legal 
remedy, fully adequate to afford redress to the p~~y ag~ 
grieved, presents, in the absence of statutory'prOVlsions to 
the contrary, a complete bar to relief by extraordinary writ 
of mandamus." And the California decision is cited as the. 
latest judicial approval of "the ruie universally recognized 
. . . that a writ of mandamus will be denied where a party 
has lost his ordinary remedy through his own neglect." 
(Other California decisions cited as applying this doctrine 
include Bush v. International Alliance. T S. E., 55 Cal.App. 
2d 357 [130 P.2d 788] ; Coffey v. Los Angeles Firemen's Re-
lief Assn., 22 Cal.App.2d 510 [71 P.2d 328] ; Tulare County 
v. Woody, 132 Cal.App. 459 [22 P.2d 743] ; Howland v. Su-
perior Court, 127 Cal.App. 695 [16 P.2d 318]; C. Scheerer 
& Co. v. Hutton, 7 Cal.App. 524 [94 P 849].) 
These principles bar relief in the present procee~g.The 
petitioners perfected a timely appeal from the ruling of th~ 
court granting a new trial. This:8 the, statutory. metho.~ 
for one aggrieved by such a determination to attack It. (Se~ 
Lauritzen v. H. L. Judell & Co., 109 Cal.App. 168 [292 P; 
,536].) But after the appeal had .be~n pending ,~~r s~~~n, 
months, the" petitioners abandoned It· and then. walted"mif~ 
months before commencing the '.' present proceeding ...... S,in.(l~ " 
the loss by neglect of a legal remedy . equally .convenJel1,t~ , 
beneficial and effective does llOt· permit 'thegrantingOfy~' 
writ of mandate in the absence of's; ,su:fficien~ Showing ofe:t~ 
cusefor the failure to pursue it,a:/ortiori, one'whovOlun'.i . 
tarily . abandons an appealshortld be" denied~ 'relief by a pre· 
rogative wrIt. '. . .. ". ' _. . ,,",-;: I ' 
The compelling effect of thIS concluslon.lS not altered.1ix 
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the fact that' the- osten~ible relief sought by the petitioner 
is the issuance' of a writ of executit.n, For the Clerk"may be 
compelled to iSsue the writ only' upon t" determination that 
the order grandng the, new trial isvoidanq the petitioner 
has voluntarily abandoned the ~lghtto !l decision upon 'that 
'qne~tlonby J.ppeal._ . ' ' 
The entire basis of, the majority." opinion's discussion of 
the availability of. manda,mUsrests upon an asst'1,mption ab-
solutely unsllPported in fact or ir. reason. Thus' it states, 
,. While mandamus .. <loes, Ilot lie if there is another adequate 
r,eniedy, an appeal is not il.lways regarded as adequate."] The 
opinion then concludes, 'IMimdamns is available as, an alter-
native remedy In cases where an appeal would. be i,nadequate, 
and the failure to appeal cannot therefore render the trial 
court's determination res judicata." There is nothing iIi. the 
majority opinion, nor are there any facts to support a con-
clusion that the petitionerS! could not adequatelyhaveob-
tained the same relief sought in the preSent proceedirigby 
continuulg their appeal from the order granting a new trial. 
Certainly there may be no assumption thai the clerk would, 
r~fuse to issue execution upon the judgment after a reversal 
of the order granting the .new trial. Ann, of· course, the con-
clusion that, since -mandamus ts vailable as an alternative 
reJnedy where an appeal would be inadequate, the ·failure to 
'appeal cannot render the trial court's determination res ju-
dIcata, falls with 'the unsupported premise thai the right of 
appeal Is here inadequate. 
Under the established. rule of stare decisis· announced by 
this court to the effect that a case is not authority for a propo-
sition not raisEidand:,co~idered (Gonzales v, Superior Oourt, 
3Cal.2d 260, 263, 264 [44P.2d g20] ; Standard Oil 00. v. 
Board of Equalization,6 Cal.2d 557. 564 [59 P.2d 119]; 
Oakland Pav. 00. v~ Whitiell Realty 00., 185 Cal. 113, 119, 
120 [195 P. 1058]), the cases of Payne v; Hunt, 2140al.605 
[7 P;2d 302], and Kraft v. Lampton, 13 CaLApp.~d 596 
[57 P.2d 1711. lllaynot be relied upon for the statement upon 
which they are cited by:the majority opinion. These' cases 
assumed, but did not consider the question or decide, that 
lThis statement in the majority opinion was modified, on denial ot 
the petition for rehearing, to read: "While mandamus does not "lie if 
there is another adequate remedy, an appeal is not regarded as ade· 
quate in this type of case." 
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mandamus was a proper remedy under the faets then before 
the court. 
, ,~' 1 
Shenk, J., and Curtis" J., concurred. 
. Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied Nov'ember' 
4, 1943. Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds,J.,'.votedfo~,a 
rehearing. 
'".1' , . .;..) 
[Sac. No. 5539. In Bank. _ 'Oct. 6, 1943.] " 
GOLD MINING AND WATER COMPANy,(a:Corpo~ation:), 
Respondent, v. A. B. SWINERTON et al., Appellants. 
[1] 
[2] 
[3] 
Mines and Minerals-Leases-Oonstru,ction-Time, for Per-
formance.-Under a mining lease executed in 1937, perform,; 
ance by the lessees was to commence prior to J a~t;tary 1, 1939, 
where they expressly covenanted,among other tlimgs, to enter 
into immediate possession of the property" and to place re-
pairs and the buildings in readiness' for the 193~-19.38 water 
run off, and where the January 1, 1939 'lausel~ the ,lea~e 
could be construed only as requiring that the first 300,00~ 
cubic yards to be worked annually was to have been mined 
by that date, rather than that said date was the time to com-
mence mining. 
Id._Leases-Breach-Repudiationof Lease.~-Whe~e one' of 
the main objects of a mining lease was to have mmeral .re-
moved from the leased property as soon as possible, and time 
and specific performance were expressly made as of the, es-
sence the lessees' subsequent repudiation of the lease a~d: 
refus~l to perform any of its provisions, including a p~omise 
to enter into immediate possession of the property, constItuted 
a material breach of the lease. . 
Id.-Actions and Proceedings-Actions Respectin~ ~ases • ....;. 
In an action to recover damages for breach of a mmmg leas~, 
the evidence supported findings that defendants had repudI-
ated the lease where both defendants testified that they would 
have nothing further to do with the lease if plaintiff refuse~ 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 10, 12, 14, 16] Mines and Minm:als, 
§ 78; [2,8,13] Mines and M~nerals, § 79; [3,15,17,19,20] Mmes 
and Minerals, § 167; [4] Landlord 'and Tenant, § 175; [5] Con-
tracts, § 246; [6, 9] Contracts, § 241 j [7J Contracts, § 245; [11] 
Landlord and Tenant, § 212; [18] Appeal and Error, § 463. 
